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CONSTRAINING STRICKLAND
By: Michael D. Cicchini*
When a convicted defendant pursues an ineffective assistance of counsel
(“IAC”) claim on appeal—for example, by alleging that the defense lawyer
failed to call an important witness at trial—the defendant must satisfy Strick-
land’s two-part test. This requires a showing that (1) defense counsel per-
formed deficiently, and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced the
defendant’s case.
The Strickland test is intentionally difficult for a defendant to satisfy, and
courts reject nearly all IAC claims. The primary justification for this is that
prosecutors and judges should not have to retry defendants because of defense
counsel’s errors, as such errors are completely outside the government’s
control.
Strangely, however, courts have dramatically expanded Strickland’s two-
part test beyond its original purpose. In addition to using it to analyze defense
counsel’s performance, courts also use it to blame defense counsel for
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. When a prosecutor cheats or a judge is
incompetent, courts turn Strickland’s two-part test on the defense lawyer to
answer for the failure to object to the prosecutor’s misconduct or to educate
the judge on the spot, in the middle of trial. Strickland, in effect, now requires
the defense lawyer to do three jobs in one: his or her own, the prosecutor’s,
and the judge’s.
This bizarre expansion of Strickland is not supported by law or logic, and it
creates serious problems for defense lawyers. Further, by viewing acts of
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct through Strickland’s lens—a frame-
work that was never intended to protect prosecutors and judges from their
own misdeeds—courts are also harming defendants’ chances on appeal and
damaging the integrity of the criminal justice system.
This Article demonstrates how courts have improperly expanded Strick-
land, explains the resulting harms, and advocates for clear, simple, and theo-
retically sound legal reform. That is, courts must hold prosecutors and judges
accountable for their own misconduct, rather than diverting blame to the de-
fense lawyer through Strickland’s ill-suited IAC framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The criminal defense lawyer’s job is, in many ways, incredibly diffi-
cult. On a practical dimension, this is best illustrated by comparing the
defense lawyer’s job to the prosecutor’s. On the day of trial, the prose-
cutor will often marshal a small army to help convict the defendant.
This prosecutorial support group may include an assigned victim-wit-
ness coordinator to manage the state’s trial witnesses, a paralegal on
standby at the office to chase down missing items or conduct mid-trial
research, an investigating police detective to sit second-chair and as-
sist in all aspects of the trial,1 a government-paid expert witness to put
the gloss of expertise on the prosecutor’s arguments,2 and sometimes
even a prosecutor-in-chief—or, in less kind words, a biased judge—to
help prosecute the state’s case from the bench.3
By comparison, many defense lawyers run a solo or small firm prac-
tice, and their clients typically have little money for the attorney’s
fees, let alone for expert witnesses and investigators. The idea of a
witness coordinator, an on-call paralegal, or a second-chair at trial is
almost unheard of. And even the most optimistic defense lawyer can
only hope for an impartial application of the law, but certainly not
1. In my experience, prosecutors nearly always use a detective as “co-counsel” at
trial, which courts routinely permit. See WIS. STAT. § 906.15(2)(b) (2018) (Exclusion
of witnesses from the courtroom during trial does not apply to “[a]n officer or em-
ployee of a party which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its
attorney.”).
2. For example, when a prosecutor contends that the timing or surrounding cir-
cumstances of an allegation is evidence of its truthfulness, the prosecutor often calls
an expert witness to bless this theory of the case. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 2016 WI
App 8, ¶¶ 1–6, 366 Wis. 2d 613, 617–21, 874 N.W.2d 610, 611–13 (using a social
worker as an expert witness to indirectly vouch for the complaining witness’s
allegation).
3. Many trial court judges are effectively prosecutors in robes. One example is
the trial judge who encouraged the prosecutor to object at various points during the
trial, prompting defense counsel to ask, “Judge, do we have two prosecutors here?”
Then, whenever the prosecutor would decline to object, the judge would simply “sus-
tain objections never made . . . .” Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 877 (Md. 1999). For
more examples of judges prosecuting from the bench, see Charles Sevilla, Protecting
the Client, the Case and Yourself from an Unruly Jurist, CHAMPION, Aug. 2004, at 28;
Abbe Smith, Judges as Bullies, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253 (2017).
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pro-defense advocacy, from the bench. Things are even worse for the
public-defender attorney, whom the government saddles with a stag-
gering workload and virtually no trial resources. One such defender
laments, “We have only nine investigators to handle more than 18,000
felony and misdemeanor cases each year.”4
Despite this uneven playing field, the criminal defense lawyer must
pursue a legally sound theory of the client’s case and adequately per-
form at all phases of trial. Committing a misstep in the trial-prepara-
tion stage, the jury selection process, opening statements, cross- or
direct-examination, the jury-instruction conference, or closing argu-
ments could subject the lawyer to the defendant’s subsequent claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”).5 This Sixth Amendment
claim is based on, and often accompanied by, a claim that defense
counsel violated his or her ethical duties of competence and diligence,
among other obligations.6
As bleak as this picture is, however, it fails to adequately capture
the true difficulty of the defense lawyer’s job. In addition to advocat-
ing for the client, defense counsel must also monitor the prosecutor
and simultaneously perform the role of trial judge. Essentially, the de-
fense lawyer must perform three jobs in one. For example, counsel’s
failure to immediately object to, and then instantly formulate and re-
quest a remedy for, the prosecutor’s intentional misconduct at trial
will normally subject the defense lawyer to an IAC claim.7 Similarly,
counsel’s failure to call immediate attention to the trial judge’s errors,
and then educate the judge on the spot about the applicable law and
how to rule, will also subject the defense lawyer to claims of
ineffectiveness.8
Holding the defense lawyer accountable for the prosecutor’s and
judge’s misconduct is a philosophically flawed approach, detached
from law and logic.9 Further, this approach creates serious problems
for defense counsel,10 makes it more difficult for the defendant to ob-
tain post-conviction relief for prosecutorial and judicial misconduct,11
and creates perverse incentives for prosecutors and judges which, in
4. Tina Peng, I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a Good Job
Representing My Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken—its-unconstitutional/
2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story.html?utm_term=.11f450287
6e7 [https://perma.cc/9XG8-5QRX].
5. See infra Part II; see also Steven Gard, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel—Stan-
dards and Remedies, 41 MO. L. REV. 483, 488–92 (1976) (discussing examples of inef-
fective assistance at numerous stages of the trial process).
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
These rules are typically adopted, often verbatim, by state supreme courts.
7. See infra Section III.B.
8. See infra Section III.A.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Section V.B.
11. See infra Section V.A.
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turn, negatively impact the integrity of the criminal justice system.12
Consequently, this Article advocates for clear, simple, and logical le-
gal reform to correct this deeply flawed approach and the very serious
problems it has created.13
Part II identifies the Strickland two-part test that governs defend-
ants’ post-conviction IAC claims. In order to win a new trial, the de-
fendant must show that counsel performed deficiently (for example,
by failing to call a defense witness) and that such deficiency
prejudiced the case.14 Part III then demonstrates how courts have
greatly expanded this Strickland test. It is now commonly used to hold
defense counsel responsible not only for his or her own performance,
but also for failing to monitor the prosecutor and educate the judge
during trial.
Part IV explains how filtering prosecutorial and judicial misconduct
through Strickland’s IAC framework is completely unjustified by the
facts, holding, and legal theory of Strickland. Part V then demon-
strates the harm to defendants, defense lawyers, and the criminal jus-
tice system when Strickland is used to blame defense counsel for the
actions of unethical prosecutors and judges.
Part VI advocates for a clear, simple, and theoretically sound ap-
proach to defendants’ IAC claims when such claims are based on acts
of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. The government’s misdeeds
should not be filtered through Strickland’s two-part test. Instead, they
should be analyzed directly, based on the prosecutor’s and judge’s
own ethical rules and constitutional obligations to the defendant. Fi-
nally, Part VII explains the tremendous benefits that would flow from
this proposed legal reform.
II. STRICKLAND’S TWO-PART TEST
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that every person charged with a
crime receives the effective assistance of counsel in his or her de-
fense.15 The landmark case on point—the case that is cited every day
12. See infra Section V.C.
13. See infra Parts VI & VII.
14. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”). Further, “[i]t has long
been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of
counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (emphasis added).
For the history and development of the right, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs,
and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 425, 428–40 (1996); Sara Mayeux,
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Before Powell v. Alabama: Lessons from History for
the Future of the Right to Counsel, 99 IOWA L. REV. 2161 (2014) (discussing the his-
tory of IAC from the late 1800s through Powell, in its various forms and under its
various labels); Jennifer Williams, Criminal Law—The Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel—The Supreme Court Minimizes the Right to the Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel by Maximizing the Deference Awarded to Barely Competent Defense Attorneys, 28
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in post-conviction and appellate decisions throughout the country—is
Strickland v. Washington.16 In Strickland, the defendant alleged that
he received ineffective assistance at the sentencing phase of his case.17
In deciding whether defense counsel was ineffective, the Court an-
nounced its now-famous two-part test:
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was defi-
cient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defen-
dant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the de-
fendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defen-
dant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or
. . . sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process
that renders the result unreliable.18
With regard to the first prong, what constitutes deficient perform-
ance depends upon the facts of the particular case and the prevailing
norms of professional practice.19 These prevailing norms are often
found in attorney ethics rules and practice guides, such as “The De-
fense Function” in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice.20
For example, attorney ethics rules require defense counsel to main-
tain competence in the law,21 to act diligently on the client’s behalf,22
and to avoid conflicts of interest when representing the client.23 The
ABA guidelines are more specific. With regard to the ethical duty of
diligence, for example, the guideline identifies and explains defense
U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 149, 153–65 (2005) (discussing the history of IAC from
early English common law through Nixon).
16. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668.
17. Id. at 675–76.
18. Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
19. Sometimes, however, an attorney’s ineffectiveness is caused by the system in
which he or she works, which is often the case with state-funded public defender pro-
grams and private bar appointments for the indigent. For numerous examples of such
systemic problems that result in IAC through no fault of the individual defense law-
yer, see Laurence A. Benner, Presumption of Guilt: Systemic Factors That Contribute
to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in California, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 263 (2009);
Richard Klein, The Constitutionalizing of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L.
REV. 1433, 1452 (1999).
20. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
21. See, e.g., WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.1 (“Competent representation requires the le-
gal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation.”).
22. See id. R. 20:1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client.”).
23. See id. R. 20:1.7 (“[A] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest.”). Conflicts of interest can arise in peculiar
circumstances. See Veronica J. Finkelstein, Better Not Call Saul: The Impact of Crimi-
nal Attorneys on Their Clients’ Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1215 (2015) (discussing counsel’s conflict of interest when
representing a defendant with whom counsel conspired to commit a crime).
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counsel’s duties to investigate the case,24 to keep the client in-
formed,25 and to follow discovery procedures,26 among other
obligations.
In Strickland, the defendant–respondent alleged that his counsel
failed to act diligently and perform competently at the sentencing
hearing.27 More specifically:
Respondent challenged counsel’s assistance in six respects. He as-
serted that counsel was ineffective because he failed to move for a
continuance to prepare for sentencing, to request a psychiatric re-
port, to investigate and present character witnesses, to seek a
presentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments
to the sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical examiner’s
reports or cross-examine the medical experts.28
The Court analyzed the facts of the case—including what counsel
did and did not do and why he acted or refrained from acting—and
concluded that “[c]ounsel’s strategy choice was well within the range
of professionally reasonable judgments . . . .”29 The defendant’s failure
on this first prong—whether counsel’s performance was deficient—
doomed his IAC claim.30 Nonetheless, the Court went on to analyze
the second prong.
The Court held, “With respect to the prejudice component, the lack
of merit of respondent’s claim is even more stark. The evidence that
respondent says his trial counsel should have offered at the sentencing
hearing would barely have altered the sentencing profile.”31 Worse
yet, with regard to the pre-sentence investigation and psychological
reports the defendant–respondent said counsel should have obtained,
“admission of the evidence respondent now offers might even have
been harmful to his case . . . .”32
Strickland’s two-part test is very difficult for the defendant to sat-
isfy. First, when determining whether defense counsel’s performance
was deficient, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be
highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-
guess counsel’s assistance after conviction or adverse sentence . . . .”33
24. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DE-
FENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4-4.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) https://www.americanbar
.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_defense_
function.pdf [https://perma.cc/76Q4-A2ZX].
25. Id. Standard 4-2.1.
26. Id. Standard 4-4.5.
27. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 699.
30. Id. at 700.
31. Id. at 699–700 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 700.
33. Id. at 689 (emphasis added). Some argue that courts have been too deferential
to defense counsel when evaluating their performance under Strickland’s first prong.
See Stephen F. Smith, Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515,
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And second, because counsel has to make numerous strategic deci-
sions before, during, and even after trial (in cases where there is a
conviction), every case will inevitably involve some sort of misstep or
sub-optimal decision. Therefore, the court must also find resulting
prejudice before counsel can be branded as ineffective.34
Unfortunately, Strickland’s theoretical soundness was soon de-
stroyed in practice. As the next Part explains, courts dramatically ex-
panded Strickland’s application in ways that are not only unjustified,
but harmful.
III. THE BIZARRE EXPANSION OF STRICKLAND
As discussed above, Strickland’s two-part test was designed for
cases where defense counsel allegedly did or failed to do something,
thus placing his or her performance outside the range of prevailing
norms as dictated by ethics rules and other performance standards.
Despite this, and rather bizarrely, courts now routinely apply Strick-
land to shift blame to defense counsel for prosecutorial and even judi-
cial misconduct—two things for which the Strickland test was never
intended and is ill-suited to do.35
This broad application of Strickland results in courts finding defense
lawyers ineffective based on “claims that [have] little to do with
whether or not defense counsel was deficient in the performance of
his or her duties.”36 This unfortunate and harmful trend has made
“defense counsel the ultimate gatekeeper of all error at the trial
level.”37 That is, “Errors of all parties to a criminal trial [are] attributa-
ble to defense counsel . . . .”38
For our purposes, “errors” mean judicial and prosecutorial miscon-
duct. Misconduct is defined as the violation of an ethical duty which,
516–17 (2009) (“For many years under Strickland, the Court . . . refused to hold de-
fense attorneys to the minimum standards of conduct prescribed by the legal profes-
sion, and blindly deferred to strategic and tactical decisions by counsel.”).
34. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. However, not all forms of IAC claims require a
showing of prejudice. See Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 427 (“Courts have not re-
quired defendants to make the Strickland showing of prejudice . . . where defense
counsel was not licensed to practice law, where counsel’s performance or behavior
was extremely egregious, or where counsel had a conflict of interest.”).
35. See infra Part IV.
36. Jon M. Woodruff, Note, Plain Error by Another Name: Are Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel Claims a Suitable Alternative to Plain Error Review in Iowa?, 102
IOWA L. REV. 1811, 1820 (2017). Woodruff’s note specifically refers to Iowa’s refusal
to adopt a plain error standard for cases where defense counsel did not object to trial
errors, including judicial errors and prosecutorial misconduct. However, the same rea-
soning also applies in states where plain error review is available but more difficult to
satisfy than Strickland’s prejudice prong. See infra Section V.A. of this Article for
further discussion of the incentives behind this blame-shifting to defense counsel.
37. Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1835 (discussing Iowa’s refusal to adopt a plain
error standard for cases where defense counsel failed to object at trial, no matter how
justifiable the reason for failing to do so).
38. Id. (emphasis added).
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in turn, violates the defendant’s rights. Because judges have an ethical
duty to be competent in the law, judicial misconduct also includes in-
competence.39 The following two Sections provide an example of each
form of misconduct (judicial and prosecutorial) and explain how de-
fense lawyers are left “holding the bag” for the government’s failures.
A. Judicial Misconduct
Harris v. Thompson provides an example of a defense lawyer being
held accountable for judicial misconduct when the defense lawyer at-
tempted to call as a witness a six-year-old child, Diante, who was an
eyewitness to the alleged crime.40 Diante was also on the prosecutor’s
witness list; however, upon realizing that Diante may actually hurt the
government’s case, the prosecutor craftily “moved to disqualify him as
incompetent to testify.”41
Upon learning of this abrupt change in position, the trial judge
should have instantly put the prosecutor on the spot by asking: “What
did you learn between the date you filed your witness list and today
that now leads you to assert that Diante is incompetent to testify?”
Instead, the trial judge decided to hold a hearing so the defense could
demonstrate Diante’s competence.42
At the hearing, the defense appeared to meet the burden the trial
judge placed on it.43 Nonetheless, after the defense lawyer established
Diante’s competency, the judge condescendingly stated that
“[d]efense counsel misperceives what the issue is with regard to wit-
ness competency . . . .”44 The judge then determined that Diante was
not competent to testify, thus leaving the defense unable to call the
only eyewitness to the alleged crime.45
In reality, it turned out to be the trial judge who “misperceive[d]
what the issue [was] with regard to witness competency.”46 Contrary
to the judge’s over-confident declaration, the applicable trial rule ac-
tually presumes competency and places the burden “on the party op-
posing competency” to demonstrate incompetence.47 Ironically, it was
the judge who was incompetent in the law, thus violating the ethics
rule that “[a] judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties,
competently and diligently.”48 And while demonstrating his own igno-
39. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.5(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007).
40. Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2012).
41. Id. at 616.
42. Id. (“[T]he Defense, it’s their witness whom they’re attempting to call. They
shall bear the burden of proof in demonstrating Diante’s competency.”)
43. See id. at 620.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 620–21 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 620.
47. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
48. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.5(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (em-
phasis added).
2020] CONSTRAINING STRICKLAND 359
rance, the judge also violated the defendant’s constitutional rights, in-
cluding the right to call witnesses and to present a defense.49
Even though the defense lawyer performed his duties effectively by
identifying and attempting to call the relevant witness, and despite the
trial judge’s “glaring failure at the competency hearing,”50 the appel-
late court nonetheless turned the Strickland standard on defense
counsel.51 The court then blamed counsel “for the failure to correct the
judge’s mistake,” thus branding the defense lawyer deficient and, due
to the resulting prejudice to the defendant, constitutionally
ineffective.52
More specifically, the court held that if counsel had properly moni-
tored the trial judge and done his job for him, “it is reasonably likely
that Diante would have been allowed to testify.”53 Amazingly, the
court reached this conclusion even though the trial judge had already
conceded, with surprising candor: “I found Diante not competent to
testify, and that would have been . . . my finding regardless of whether
I had articulated the correct burden of proof.”54
Not only was the trial judge wrong about the law—and wrong again
when he finally applied the correct law to the facts of the case—but he
also made it perfectly clear that his errors were immune to correc-
tion.55 Nonetheless, the appellate court declared that this was all de-
fense counsel’s fault.56 The defense lawyer was therefore held
accountable and the trial judge suffered no consequence for his failure
to understand, and to apply in good faith, incredibly basic procedural
law that constitutes an essential part of the judge’s job.
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Shifting gears from judicial to prosecutorial misconduct, an example
of a defense lawyer being held to answer for a prosecutor’s misdeeds
can be found in Jordan v. Hepp, in which the jury’s verdict was likely
to hinge on its determination of witness credibility.57 Understanding
this, the prosecutor made the following argument to the jury:
Now, the big question here is the credibility. Who do you believe?
. . . Somebody’s lying. Who is it? [The detective’s] going to put her
whole career and her future on the line for this case? She does this
everyday. She’s investigating homicide cases everyday for years.
49. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
50. Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 637 (7th Cir. 2012).
51. Id. at 639.
52. Id. at 644 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 640.
54. Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
55. See id. at 621.
56. See id. at 650.
57. Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 847–48 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Who has the most to lose based on your verdict in this case? Her or
him?58
The prosecutor’s argument “is a textbook case of improper vouch-
ing.”59 That is, “By arguing that the detective would lose her job by
giving false testimony, the prosecutor ‘convey[ed] the impression that
evidence not known to the jury’—namely, that the detective would
face career repercussions for false testimony—‘supports the charges
against the defendant.’”60 In other words, “The prosecutor relied on
evidence not in the record but that appeared to be within his personal
knowledge: that the detective would lose her job if she wasn’t telling
the truth.”61
Admittedly, relative to other forms of improper prosecutorial argu-
ment, vouching falls near the mild end of the spectrum.62 Nonetheless,
it is a clear violation of black-letter law, and the prosecutor who
makes this argument violates his or her ethical duty as “minister of
justice,”63 among other ethical duties.64 This, in turn, violates the de-
fendant’s constitutional rights:
Due process . . . forbids a prosecutor to urge a jury to rely on evi-
dence that is not in the record, whether that evidence is from news-
paper accounts, the Internet, or the prosecutor’s own mouth. It
requires the jury to be left alone to do its own job, evaluating the
evidence the trial judge admitted, and coming to its own indepen-
dent conclusion (as opposed to one dictated by the prosecutor).65
What, then, did the court do when faced with this issue on appeal?
It immediately pivoted to the defense lawyer and even identified him,
but not the unethical prosecutor, by name: “In Jordan’s trial, Bohach
failed to object to any of the prosecutor’s improper statements. Our
first question is whether that failure rendered his performance ineffec-
tive under Strickland.”66
Under basic principles of logic and fairness, the prosecutor should
be held to answer for his or her own ethical violations. Nonetheless, a
court, once again, placed the defense lawyer in its crosshairs for a gov-
ernment agent’s misconduct. The prosecutor violated well-established
58. Id. at 847.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 847–48 (emphasis added).
62. See Michael D. Cicchini, Combating Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Ar-
guments, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 887, 896–912 (2018) (discussing ten different types of im-
proper arguments).
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(“This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is
accorded procedural justice”).
64. Id. at r. 3.4(e) (“A lawyer shall not . . . in trial . . . assert personal knowledge of
facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to . . .
the credibility of a witness . . . or the guilt or innocence of an accused . . . .”).
65. Jordan, 831 F.3d at 848.
66. Id.
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law to win a conviction by improper means. However, it was the de-
fense lawyer, not the prosecutor, who was called out by name and told
to account for his alleged deficiencies in the courtroom: namely, the
failure to immediately, on the spot and in the middle of trial, identify,
object to, and formulate and request a remedy for the prosecutor’s
unethical tactics.67
IV. SQUARE PEGS, ROUND HOLE
Prosecutors and judges commit misconduct, in countless variations,
every day in our state and federal criminal courts. The precise form of
the misconduct will change from case to case and ranges from incom-
petence to blatant, intentional wrongdoing. However, in nearly all
cases, it is the defense lawyer who will be blamed for failing to moni-
tor the prosecutor and perform the trial judge’s job—all while simulta-
neously fulfilling counsel’s own ethical and professional obligations.
This blame-shifting tactic can produce “absurd findings of constitu-
tionally inadequate representation” by defense counsel, especially
when the judge’s or prosecutor’s misconduct (for which counsel is
blamed) is extreme.68
For example, when a trial judge “made inappropriate comments
and threats and assessed repeated fines” against defense counsel in
front of the jury and then actively “limited the defense’s ability to pre-
sent a case,” the defense lawyer was still potentially on the hook “be-
cause he did not object to the judge’s comments or move for a
mistrial.”69 Similarly, a prosecutor “attacked defense counsel in clos-
ing argument, calling his opening statement ‘a whole-hearted
fabrication’ and saying either defense counsel ‘flat out lied to you’ in
opening or [the defendant] lied on the stand: ‘Either way, I wouldn’t
believe either of them as far as I can throw them.’”70 Despite the
prosecutor’s gross misconduct, the first question in the appellate
court’s analysis was this: Did defense counsel “object to the prosecu-
tor’s closing”?71
While such blame-shifting is maddening to the defense lawyer, it is
highly beneficial to the prosecutor and judge. Much to their delight,
the courts’ use of Strickland’s IAC framework completely relieves
67. Id. at 849–50 (The court remanded the case, thirteen years after the trial, for
the defense lawyer to explain whether he had “a strategic reason for his failure to
object to the [prosecutor’s] vouching.”).
68. Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1812–13 (discussing absurd findings of deficient
performance by defense counsel in cases where courts abuse the IAC framework).
69. Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 338 (Nev. 1998).
70. Improper Closing Argument Earns Prosecutor an OLR Referral, but Doesn’t
Get Defendant a New Trial, ON POINT (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.wisconsinappeals
.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsin-state-public-defender/improper-closing-argument-
earns-prosecutor-an-olr-referral-but-doesnt-get-defendant-a-new-trial/ [https://perma
.cc/4A3N-K4ZC].
71. Id.
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these government agents of their own ethical obligations.72 However,
using Strickland under these circumstances is like trying to jam two
square pegs into a round hole. Strickland simply was not designed for
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. This is obvious for at least four
reasons.
First, the facts of Strickland involve defense counsel’s alleged failure
to fulfill counsel’s own obligations under the applicable ethics rules,
the prevailing standards of practice, and the Sixth Amendment.73
Strickland does not involve counsel’s alleged failure to monitor the
prosecutor or educate the trial judge, nor does it involve counsel’s al-
leged failure to ensure that these two government agents comply with
their own ethics rules, professional standards, and constitutional
obligations.74
Second, the sources cited in Strickland—the ethics rules and ABA
practice standards—once again do not address defense counsel’s sup-
posed duty to monitor or otherwise referee the presumably competent
and impartial magistrate (the trial judge) or the so-called minister of
justice (the prosecutor).75
Third, the pre-Strickland history of IAC cases does not impose a
burden on defense counsel to ensure that the prosecutor and judge
follow the law.76 In fact, these pre-Strickland cases drew “a fundamen-
tal distinction between incompetence claims . . . and outside interfer-
ence claims” where the problem was caused by the government’s
action rather than defense counsel’s acts or omissions.77
72. See Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1835–36 (discussing how Iowa’s refusal to con-
front prosecutorial and judicial misconduct not objected to at trial, except through the
IAC framework, “ignores the important responsibilities borne by the court and the
prosecution”).
73. Strickland was recently expanded to include defense counsel’s performance
during the pretrial stages of the criminal process, including plea bargaining. See Justin
F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1161, 1189–90 (2012). It has long applied, of course, to other pretrial obli-
gations. See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the
Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1097, 1108–09 (2004).
74. See Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1835 (arguing, in the context of Iowa’s refusal
to adopt the plain error doctrine, that “there are a number of conceivable errors aris-
ing from attorney or judicial conduct that would (or should) be difficult to shoehorn
into an [IAC] appeal, because they do not implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel”).
75. See WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.1, 20:1.3, 20:1.7 (on ethics rules). See ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION,
Standards 4-4.1, 4-2.1, 4-4.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993), https://www.americanbar.org/con
tent/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_defense_function
.pdf [https://perma.cc/76Q4-A2ZX] (on practice standards).
76. See generally Mayeux, supra note 15 (discussing the history and origin of mod-
ern IAC law which is rooted in defense counsel’s failure to perform his or her ethical
obligations, not in prosecutorial cheating or judicial bias or incompetence).
77. See Maureen R. Green, Comment, A Coherent Approach to Ineffective Assis-
tance of Counsel Claims, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1516, 1520 (1983) (discussing cases in
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Fourth, and most significantly, the Strickland test is intentionally
difficult for the defendant to satisfy, thus making it difficult for him or
her to win a new trial.78 This is because “[t]he government is not re-
sponsible for, and hence not able to prevent, attorney errors that will
result in reversal of a conviction or sentence.”79 Strickland’s difficult-
to-satisfy test therefore ensures that prosecutors and judges are not
constantly retrying cases due to defense counsel’s errors—something
that is completely outside the government’s control.
However, that same reasoning mandates that Strickland not apply
to instances of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct—actions that are
within the government’s control. With regard to a prosecutor’s mis-
conduct, “because the prosecution is directly responsible” for it, such
misconduct is “easy for the government to prevent.”80 The govern-
ment, therefore, must not be allowed to use Strickland to protect the
prosecution from itself. In cases of judicial misconduct, the Strickland
test is a horrible fit for the same reason: the government must not be
allowed to use Strickland to protect the judge from his or her own
incompetence, bias, or other misconduct—things for which the judge
is responsible and, therefore, can prevent.
Despite this, whenever a prosecutor or judge breaks the rules—in-
cluding well-established legal principles and even their own ethics
rules—thus violating the defendant’s constitutional rights, the appel-
late courts routinely turn to Strickland’s two-part test.81 This ensures
that blame for the prosecutor’s or judge’s misconduct shifts to defense
counsel. In short, the courts’ use of the Strickland standard means that
the defense lawyer must literally do three jobs in one: his or her own,
the prosecutor’s, and the judge’s.
This raises the following question: As long as the defendant gets his
kick at a post-conviction cat—some cat, any cat—who cares whether
the prosecutor, the judge, or the defense lawyer is held to answer for
the misconduct at trial?
V. NATURAL CONSEQUENCES
The answer to the above question—who cares?—is that the defen-
dant cares, the defense lawyer cares, and those interested in the integ-
rity of the criminal justice system care. The practice of cramming acts
of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct through Strickland’s IAC fil-
which the trial judge committed misconduct that interfered with defense counsel’s
performance).
78. See Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 438–39 (describing the Strickland hurdle as
“insurmountable” for the defendant).
79. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 692.
81. Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1835–36.
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ter “is ill-conceived and negatively impacts defense counsel, defend-
ants, and [the] judicial system in general.”82
A. Harm to the Defendant
When the defendant’s appellate lawyer files a post-conviction mo-
tion or appeal alleging IAC for counsel’s failure to monitor the prose-
cutor or educate the judge, the defendant suffers great harm. One
reason is that, as explained earlier, the Strickland two-part test was
intentionally designed to be difficult for the defendant to satisfy.83 The
reason is that the test is supposed to apply only to defense counsel’s
errors, thus protecting prosecutors and judges from having to retry
cases based on errors completely out of their control.84
In fact, the test is so tough to satisfy that defendants rarely get past
the first prong on deficient performance.85 Without deficient perform-
ance, of course, there can be no violation of the Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the defendant’s IAC
post-conviction motion or appeal necessarily fails.86
For example, assume that the defendant’s appellate lawyer alleges
IAC for defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s im-
proper closing argument. Under the first prong, the court must give
great deference to counsel’s judgment and decision-making at that
point in time.87 As long as the defense lawyer had a reason for not
objecting, the court will accept that reason and will not find deficient
82. Id. at 1832 (discussing Iowa’s failure to adopt the plain error standard and its
use of Strickland’s IAC framework for matters unrelated to defense counsel’s per-
formance). Woodruff identifies an even more harmful effect—an effect beyond the
scope of this Article—of overusing Strickland’s IAC framework: “These [Iowa] cases
require that trial counsel object based not only on what the law was at the time of the
trial, but to accurately predict future developments in the law and to object at trial
based on this knowledge of future events.” Id.
83. See Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 438–39.
84. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
85. See Mayeux, supra note 15, at 2162 (“Although rarely successful, IAC claims
now comprise the majority of challenges to criminal convictions in the United
States.”) (footnote omitted) (citing numerous sources including state and federal sta-
tistics); Williams, supra note 15, at 168–69 (“The United States Supreme Court has
stated that a defense counsel’s performance is not deficient if it falls within ‘the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.’ . . . The Nixon decision goes one step
further in widening what the courts can determine to be reasonable assistance.”).
86. Even when courts find deficient performance, they will often go out of their
way to avoid finding prejudice to the defendant’s case. See Stephanos Bibas, The Psy-
chology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 1
UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (2004) (“Courts rarely reverse convictions for [IAC], even if the
defendant’s lawyer was asleep, drunk, unprepared, or unknowledgeable.”) (citing,
among other sources, Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 426–27.).
87. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“Judicial scrutiny of coun-
sel’s performance must be highly deferential.”).
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performance. And in reality, there is nearly always a reason for coun-
sel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s improper closing argument.88
[T]he conventional wisdom within the field of trial advocacy is that
attorneys should not object during closing arguments “unless things
are terrible” . . . . [C]ounsel may be concerned about irritating the
judge or jury by interrupting opposing counsel, which can heighten
jurors’ general tendencies to favor prosecutors over defense coun-
sel. More specifically, defense counsel may be concerned about the
jury’s likely reaction if her objection is overruled. A trial court deci-
sion to overrule an objection . . . may actually encourage the jury to
rely on those comments.89
Additionally, even if the defense lawyer wants to object, doing so is
not easy. While a prosecutor may put a great deal of forethought into
an improper closing argument, such cheating often surprises defense
counsel in the heat of battle. It is “difficult for defense counsel to
quickly identify the problem and raise an objection in seconds at trial.
Even if defense counsel is troubled by the prosecutor’s comments,
these conditions make it difficult for defense counsel to articulate
their objections quickly.”90
The risk and difficulty of objecting serves as a built-in reason for
courts to deny IAC claims when such claims are rooted in the prosecu-
tor’s misconduct. This means that, under Strickland’s IAC framework,
because the defense lawyer acted within the very wide range of pro-
fessional norms, his or her snap decision-making at trial cannot be
deemed deficient (Strickland’s first prong). As a result, the defen-
dant’s IAC claim fails, no matter how harmful the prosecutor’s mis-
conduct was to the case (Strickland’s second prong, which the
appellate court rarely reaches).
While it is difficult and risky for defense counsel to object to a pros-
ecutor’s misconduct, the levels of difficulty and risk are even greater
when correcting a judge in front of the jury for his or her bias, incom-
petence, or other forms of misconduct. Defense lawyers “are, under-
standably, loath to challenge the propriety of a trial judge’s
utterances, for fear of antagonizing him and thereby prejudicing a cli-
ent’s case.”91 Once again, this legitimate, built-in reason for not ob-
88. This is true with regard to most IAC claims. See Klein, supra note 19, at 1459
(“Can’t every decision that an attorney makes be characterized as part of the lawyer’s
strategy?”).
89. Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 357 (2015)
(footnotes omitted). The defense lawyer’s concern about drawing further attention to
objectionable information is supported by empirical evidence. See Shari S. Diamond
et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next
Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1592 (2012) (discussing and citing an empirical study
on the effect of overruled objections).
90. Bowman, supra note 89, at 356 (footnote omitted).
91. Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 338 (Nev. 1998) (emphasis added) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
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jecting essentially dooms any IAC claim before the appellate court
even gets to Strickland’s second prong.
Given the near impossibility of satisfying Strickland’s first prong,
why doesn’t the defendant’s appellate lawyer simply go after the of-
fending prosecutor or judge directly, instead of targeting defense
counsel with Strickland’s IAC framework? As explained in Section
VI.A. of this Article, this could be the better route, depending on the
particular state’s law. However, the appellate lawyer’s concern is this:
when he or she bypasses the defense lawyer and goes after the offend-
ing prosecutor or judge directly, the “plain error” doctrine may be
invoked.92
The potential problem is that the plain error doctrine could, at least
in theory, be more difficult for a defendant to satisfy than Strickland’s
second (prejudice) prong.93 (That will not matter, of course, if the de-
fendant cannot get past Strickland’s first prong.) But in practice, these
different standards—Strickland’s prejudice prong and plain error—
are probably distinctions without a difference. In reality, courts often
reach their predetermined conclusion to affirm the defendant’s con-
viction and then merely parrot the legal standard after the fact.94
Much like Strickland’s prejudice prong, plain error tests are worded
rather ominously. One author framed the test this way: “[R]eversal on
appeal will only occur if” the government’s misconduct “seriously af-
fected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceed-
ing.”95 Other courts have held that “the plain error standard
92. Nearly all states use the plain error doctrine. For the history and purpose of
the doctrine, see Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1813–18.
93. This is not always the case, however, as some plain error tests appear easier for
the defendant to satisfy. See id. at 1817 (discussing the Illinois plain error framework
which can be satisfied by showing either (1) any severity of error in a close case or (2)
a serious error regardless of the strength of the state’s case). See also infra Section
VI.A. for further discussion of plain error.
94. In what should be embarrassing to the courts, they are often in such a rush to
affirm the conviction that they will even parrot the wrong legal standard. This is true
not only in the IAC context, but in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Jensen v. Cle-
ments, 800 F.3d 892, 903–04 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Despite this long line of cases establish-
ing the test for harmless error, the Wisconsin appellate court’s reasoning reads as
though it is conducting an evaluation of whether there was sufficient evidence to sup-
port the verdict, not whether the error in admitting [evidence] affected the jury’s ver-
dict. . . . That is very different than the harmless error test under clearly established
Supreme Court law.”) (emphasis added) (granting the defendant’s petition for a new
trial due to appellate court’s application of the wrong test); State v. Knapp, 2010 WI
App 71, ¶ 5, 325 Wis. 2d 402, 786 N.W.2d 489 (“Knapp argues that the trial court
erroneously exercised its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial by deciding it
under the ‘manifest necessity’ standard. Knapp is correct that the court erred . . . . In
addressing Knapp’s motion, the court should have determined whether alleged error
was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial.”) (emphasis added) (affirming the
outcome despite trial court’s application of the wrong test).
95. Anthony Flores, You Can’t Say That, or Maybe You Can: An Analysis of
Michigan Prosecutor Closing Argument Law, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 273, 283
(2010).
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additionally requires that [the defendant] ‘establish not only that the
[government misconduct] denied him a fair trial, but also that the out-
come of the proceedings would have been different absent the [mis-
conduct].’”96 Yet other courts require the defendant to leap a bizarre
hurdle of demonstrating that the government’s misconduct was some-
how unusual, as “[p]lain error review is ordinarily limited to ‘block-
busters’ and does not ‘consider the ordinary backfires—whether or
not harmful to a litigant’s cause—which may mar a trial record.’”97
Quite to the client’s detriment, then, defense counsel must perform
his or her own duties at trial while simultaneously monitoring the
prosecutor and educating the trial judge. Counsel’s failure to do all
three jobs at once will invoke Strickland or, in the alternative, the
plain error test—both of which make it incredibly difficult for the de-
fendant to obtain a new trial.98
B. Harm to the Defense Lawyer
Holding defense counsel responsible for the prosecutor’s and
judge’s performance makes the defense lawyer’s job exponentially
more difficult than it already is. As explained in Part I, the criminal
process is stacked heavily in favor of the state to begin with, and the
defense lawyer must perform his or her own trial duties with little or
no assistance and few resources. On top of this, doing the job of the
prosecutor and the judge can be exhausting, if not impossible. Such
responsibilities take up a tremendous amount of time and attention—
both before and during trial—that could be better spent planning a
defense and focusing on counsel’s own obligations.99
The preposterousness of this current state of affairs is best illus-
trated by a sports analogy—nearly any sport will do. Simply put, no
legitimate sport would ever implement a set of rules that required one
of the teams, or one of the competitors in an individual sport, to (1)
play the game and follow its rules, and (2) monitor and report the
other team’s or player’s cheating, and (3) educate the referee by iden-
tifying and correcting all of his or her errors.
A sport that employed this framework could not exist. Using Amer-
ican football as an example, all it took was one missed pass-interfer-
ence call by one referee in one playoff game to the detriment of one
team to cause a league-wide uproar and subsequent off-season
96. United States v. Anderson, 303 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citation
omitted).
97. United States v. Roberts, 119 F.3d 1006, 1014 (1st Cir. 1997) (internal citation
omitted).
98. See infra Section VI.A. for further discussion of the plain error test as an alter-
native to Strickland’s IAC test.
99. Time-consuming pretrial measures designed to prevent government miscon-
duct include the motion in limine. See Cicchini, supra note 62, at 923–24 (discussing
the use of the motion in limine to anticipate and prevent prosecutorial misconduct in
closing arguments).
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changes in the rules.100 If only the criminal defense lawyer—who, in-
stead of playing a game against other players on the football field,
defends our liberties against government agents in the courtroom—
could generate the same collective moral outrage.
In addition to increasing the difficulty of the defense lawyer’s job by
outrageous proportions—something that also indirectly (if not di-
rectly) harms the defendant’s chances of success at the jury trial—
Strickland’s focus on defense counsel instead of the offending govern-
ment agents creates other, longer-lasting problems for the defense
lawyer.
First, courts often take years to decide a defendant’s IAC claim.101
This means that, years after the prosecutor cheats or the judge fails to
do his or her job at trial, the defense lawyer will likely have to prepare
for and testify at the IAC hearing.102 This preparation will include lo-
cating the client’s file, re-reading it and the trial transcript, and at-
tempting to recall his or her decision-making process when failing to
object to the government’s misconduct years earlier. Attempting to
recreate such history takes an enormous amount of time—time that is
uncompensated and can be better spent defending current clients.
As an example of the sheer absurdity of this burden, consider a case
discussed earlier. In Jordan v. Hepp, the defendant was tried in
2003.103 In closing arguments to the jury, the prosecutor violated ethi-
cal obligations and a basic rule of trial practice by vouching for the
state’s witnesses.104 Thirteen years later, in 2016, the appellate court
targeted the defense lawyer: “We instruct the district court to hold a
hearing . . . to allow the parties to present evidence about whether
[the defense lawyer] had a strategic reason for failing to object to the
prosecution’s improper vouching for the witness’s credibility.”105
100. See Andrew Beaton, After the Infamous Blown Call in New Orleans, the NFL
Makes Penalty Reviewable, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/after-the-infamous-blown-call-in-new-orleans-the-nfl-makes-penalty-review
able-11553697887 [https://perma.cc/V3KQ-H5J2].
101. See Cicchini, supra note 62, at 921.
102. The defense lawyer will usually be subpoenaed to testify as to the reasons for
his or her decisions made years earlier at the trial. See Richard Van Rheenen, Inequi-
table Treatment of Ineffective Assistance Litigants, 19 IND. L. REV. 159, 160 (1986)
(“Obtaining an evidentiary hearing is critical to the success of most ineffective assis-
tance claims.”).
103. Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016).
104. Id. at 846 (discussing “the rule providing that a prosecutor may not urge a jury
to base its decision on information known to the prosecutor but not presented at
trial”). In addition, the case was initially tried in a Wisconsin court, and one of the
state’s applicable ethics rules is that a lawyer shall not, “in trial . . . assert personal
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal
opinion as to . . . the credibility of a witness . . . .” WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:3.4(e). Further,
the state’s ethics rule on the special responsibilities of the prosecutor anoints him or
her as “minister of justice,” a title that “carries with it specific obligations to see that
the defendant is accorded procedural justice . . . .” WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:3.8, ABA cmt.
1.
105. Jordan, 831 F.3d at 850 (emphasis added).
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(From the defendant’s perspective, of course, this thirteen year delay
gives new meaning to the phrase “justice delayed is justice denied.”)
Second, as explained earlier, most of the time there is a reason for
defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s cheating or the
judge’s erroneous trial rulings.106 As a result, the court will not find
defense counsel deficient and the defendant’s IAC claim will fail. But
what if, at the time the government committed misconduct at trial, the
defense lawyer was focusing on his or her own job duties instead of
closely monitoring the prosecutor or judge? Or what if, as was likely
the case in Jordan, it is impossible for counsel to remember what he or
she was thinking during that one split second thirteen years earlier?
In cases like this, there is a much greater chance that defense coun-
sel—who is often personally named in the appellate court’s published
opinion—will be branded as deficient and, therefore, ineffective for
the entire legal community and prospective clients to see.107 Given
today’s easy access to information through the internet, including so-
cial media and attorney-rating websites, this type of unfair branding
could be career threatening for a defense lawyer.
Third, the court finding a defense attorney ineffective could lead to
the reporting of an ethics violation. That is, except in cases where the
judge actively prevented the defense lawyer from being effective,108 a
finding of ineffectiveness is usually strong evidence of the defense
lawyer’s failure to comply with the ethics rules—typically, the rules
requiring competence and diligence. As one appellate court acknowl-
edged when identifying and discussing an attorney’s unethical behav-
ior at trial, courts are obligated to report such misconduct.109
“Therefore,” the court held, “we direct the clerk of this court to send a
copy of this opinion to the Office of Lawyer Regulation for any action
it deems appropriate.”110
Fourth, regardless of whether the court actually finds the defense
attorney ineffective or in violation of the ethics rules, merely being
accused of such things can impact the attorney’s ability to obtain
work. In Wisconsin, for example, the Office of the State Public De-
fender (“SPD”) certifies lawyers for case appointments by the
agency.111 The SPD’s application specifically asks, “Have you ever
been the subject of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel?”112
106. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Jordan, 831 F.3d at 850.
108. See, e.g., Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 338 (Nev. 1998) (“Oade argues that the
district court judge made inappropriate comments and threats and assessed repeated
fines, which . . . limited the defense’s ability to present a case . . . .”).
109. State v. Mayer, 2014 WI App 110, ¶ 19, 357 Wis. 2d 722, 855 N.W.2d 904.
110. Id.
111. Assigned Counsel Division: General Certification Application, WIS. ST. PUB.
DEFENDERS (Feb. 7, 2010), https://www.wispd.org/images/ACD_Forms/General%20
Certification%20Application.pdf [https://perma.cc/SY72-JYD6].
112. Id. (emphasis added).
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Of course, if the answer to the question did not affect the SPD’s
decision to certify a lawyer, the SPD would not ask the question in the
first place. Similarly, if a finding of ineffectiveness is what mattered,
the SPD would not ask whether the attorney has merely “been the
subject of a claim” of ineffectiveness.
Fifth, a finding of IAC “may expose an attorney to financial liabil-
ity.”113 For example, in Iowa, a statute “specifically contemplates civil
financial liability for appointed counsel when: (1) a court finds that a
conviction occurred because of [IAC]; and (2) the ineffective counsel
is the proximate cause of the damage.”114 In addition, states may also
recognize “a common law legal malpractice claim that can be asserted
against any attorney . . . so the potential for civil liability as a result of
[IAC] claims is certainly not limited to appointed counsel.”115
In sum, applying Strickland to situations for which its framework
was not intended—specifically, using it to blame defense counsel for
the prosecutor’s or judge’s misconduct—not only makes defense
counsel’s job far more difficult, but also creates long-lasting, serious
consequences for the defense lawyer while the government agent who
committed the misconduct typically skates free.
C. Harm to the System
Holding defense lawyers accountable for prosecutorial and judicial
misconduct also harms the criminal justice system more generally.
First, IAC claims usually require a post-conviction evidentiary hearing
for the defense lawyer to testify.116 The reason is that “[a] fair assess-
ment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circum-
stances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct
from counsel’s perspective at the time.”117 As discussed earlier, this
takes a great deal of the defense lawyer’s time and energy. But he or
she is not the only person involved in the process, and IAC hearings
consume public resources as well.118
Second, filtering prosecutorial and judicial misconduct through
Strickland’s IAC framework lets prosecutors and trial judges off the
hook for their own misconduct, thus creating perverse incentives and
even encouraging further misbehavior.119 This blame-shifting is one
reason that appellate courts, when they eventually grow tired of hear-
113. Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1833.
114. Id. at 1833–34.
115. Id. at 1834.
116. See Van Rheenen, supra note 102, at 160.
117. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (emphasis added).
118. See infra Part VII.
119. Cicchini, supra note 62, at 888–89.
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ing appeals rooted in acts of prosecutorial misconduct, pathetically
grovel to prosecutors, all but begging them to stop cheating at trial.120
For example, after allowing repeated acts of prosecutorial miscon-
duct without consequence, one appellate court again let the prosecu-
tor off the hook while lamenting: “[I]t is disheartening, to say the
least, to learn that [the prosecutor] takes ‘pride’ in our admonitions,
apparently because we did not reverse the judgment rendered. We
most earnestly urge counsel to reconsider her approach . . . .”121 One
judge described such begging as undesirable “helpless piety.”122
Of course, there is no incentive for cheating prosecutors to “recon-
sider [their] approach” when, under Strickland’s IAC framework, it is
defense lawyers who are held to answer for their reaction to
prosecutorial misconduct, rather than prosecutors being held to ac-
count for their commission of the misconduct in the first place.123
Third, it is also likely (though difficult to quantitatively verify) that
the public loses confidence in, and respect for, the criminal justice sys-
tem when judges are ignorant of the law and prosecutors are law-
less.124 Here, once again, an analogy is useful: professional wrestling is
considered pure entertainment, rather than a legitimate sport, for
good reason.
Fourth, the Supreme Court in Strickland even warned, long before
courts expanded the two-part test to hold defense lawyers accountable
for the government’s misconduct, that “intrusive post-trial inquiry into
[defense] attorney performance” would be detrimental.125 Such in-
quiries could “dampen the ardor and impair the independence of de-
fense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and
undermine the trust between attorney and client.”126 These concerns
increase, of course, when defense counsel is put under the microscope
and criticized for his or her decision-making when faced with an un-
ethical prosecutor or judge. This is a level of intrusiveness the Su-
preme Court could not even imagine when it decided Strickland.
120. See United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
121. People v. Congious, No. B0202709 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1987).
122. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d at 661.
123. Cicchini, supra note 62, at 894.
124. Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004) (With regard
to “incompetent” judges, “These bad judges terrorize courtrooms, impair the func-
tioning of the legal system, and undermine public confidence in the law.”); Kenneth
Rosenthal, Prosecutor Misconduct, Convictions, and Double Jeopardy: Case Studies in
an Emerging Jurisprudence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 887, 958 (1998) (With regard to
prosecutorial misconduct, “[T]here is an incalculable cost in damaged integrity [to the
judicial system itself] that may be difficult to repair, and which affects the social fabric
in a manner that implicates more widespread consequences.”).
125. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
126. Id.
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VI. LEGAL REFORM: ALLOCATING BLAME
Legal reform for addressing IAC claims—when such claims are
rooted in prosecutorial or judicial misconduct rather than true de-
fense-lawyer error—must focus on allocating blame to the offending
prosecutor or judge.127 Defendants’ appellate lawyers and the courts
have the ability to reform the status quo—each group in its own way.
A. Using Plain Error
When a defendant’s appellate lawyer sees prosecutorial or judicial
misconduct in the trial transcript, the knee-jerk reaction is to invoke
Strickland’s two-part IAC framework and blame the defense lawyer
for failing to object to the prosecutor or educate the trial judge. That
is good for the unethical prosecutor and judge, as they are let off the
hook for their unethical behavior. However, it is bad for the defense
lawyer, and it may actually be bad for the defendant as well.128 The
appellate lawyer may not be doing the defendant any good by at-
tempting to shift blame to defense counsel, as Strickland’s IAC frame-
work may actually be more difficult to satisfy than the plain error
standard or other standards.
First, recall that IAC claims rarely succeed.129 And those that do
succeed are likely based on true defense-lawyer errors—such as, for
example, failing to investigate the case or call a witness—rather than
on the counsel’s failure to monitor the prosecutor or educate the trial
judge during the heat of battle.130 As discussed earlier, the primary
reason for defendants’ low success rate is the built-in explanation for
127. Cicchini, supra note 62, at 920.
128. See Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1835 (urging the adoption of a plain error
framework because Strickland’s IAC framework is of little help to defendants and is
unfair to defense counsel).
129. Mayeux, supra note 15, at 2162; Bibas, supra note 86, at 1; Kirchmeier, supra
note 15, at 438.
130. Often, even truly deficient performance by the defense lawyer is not enough to
show prejudice. And if a court refuses to reverse a conviction when “the defendant’s
lawyer was asleep, drunk, unprepared, or unknowledgeable,” it is unlikely to do so
when the lawyer merely fails to lodge an objection on the spur of the moment and in
the heat of battle at trial. Bibas, supra note 86, at 1. In a recent, extreme case of
attorney misconduct, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin disciplined defense counsel for
multiple ethics violations, including the failure to maintain his law license during the
representation. In addition, the attorney’s other ethics violations “prevent[ed] [the
defendant] from adequately understanding and participating in his own defense . . . .”
State v. Cooper, 2019 WI 73, ¶ 9, 387 Wis. 2d 439, 929 N.W.2d 192. Nonetheless, when
it came to finding deficient performance under Strickland, the court refused. “It’s
almost like an Einsteinian multiverse. In one universe the lawyer’s misconduct is so
awful that he receives consecutive license suspensions. In a parallel universe, where a
criminal defendant’s due process rights are stake, the same conduct is not bad enough
to grant relief.” SCOW: Professional Misconduct Warranting Suspension Does Not
Demonstrate Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, ON POINT (June 24, 2019), http://www
.wisconsinappeals.net/on-point-by-the-wisconsin-state-public-defender/scow-profes
sional-misconduct-warranting-suspension-does-demonstrate-ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel/ [https://perma.cc/YRE5-BBYM].
2020] CONSTRAINING STRICKLAND 373
defense counsel’s failure to object: it was reasonable trial strategy.131
Because of this, defendants, unable to prove deficient performance,
are doomed by Strickland’s first prong and never even get to the
prejudice prong. The result: no matter how prejudicial the prosecu-
tor’s or judge’s misconduct, the defendant loses the IAC claim.
Second, Strickland’s second (prejudice) prong—assuming the de-
fendant’s IAC claim even makes it that far—might be just as difficult
to satisfy as the plain error test. Here, the law varies greatly by state,
and appellate counsel will have to carefully research the standards in
his or her jurisdiction. The Illinois plain error test, for example, ap-
pears on its face to be fairly liberal and easy to satisfy compared to
Strickland’s second (prejudice) prong.132 Other states may employ a
more difficult-to-satisfy plain error test.133 Nonetheless, the following
intra-state illustration will be helpful.
In Wisconsin, when a defense lawyer fails to object to a prosecutor’s
improper closing argument, for example, the error is waived, but the
appellate lawyer can still attack the prosecutor’s misconduct directly
under the plain error doctrine.134 Under this test, the defendant will
win a new trial if the prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the trial
with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.”135 Further, “the existence of plain error will turn on the facts
of the particular case. The quantum of evidence properly admitted
and the seriousness of the error involved are particularly impor-
tant.”136 Serious error “may tip the scales in favor of reversal in a
close case, even though the same [error] would be harmless in the
context of a case demonstrating overwhelming evidence of guilt.”137
Compare that to Strickland’s second (prejudice) prong (assuming
the defendant’s IAC claim somehow satisfies the first prong). “[T]he
defendant must show that the deficient performance [of defense coun-
sel in failing to object or correct the judge] prejudiced the defense.138
This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to de-
prive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”139
Further, the defendant must show by “a probability sufficient to un-
dermine confidence in the outcome” that, “but for counsel’s unprofes-
131. See supra Section V.A.
132. Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1817.
133. See id.
134. State v. Cameron, 2016 WI App 54, ¶ 11, 370 Wis. 2d 661, 885 N.W.2d (empha-
sis added) (citing State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶ 88, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613 N.W.2d
606.).
135. Id. at ¶ 18.
136. Id. at ¶ 11 (citing State v. Jorgensen, 2008 WI App 60, ¶ 22, 310 Wis. 2d 138,
754 N.W.2d 77).
137. Id.
138. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (emphasis added).
139. Id.
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sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”140
And to complete the picture, assume defense counsel did every-
thing right at trial: counsel lodged a timely objection to the prosecu-
tor’s closing argument and then, in accordance with applicable
procedural laws, moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.
What is the legal standard on post-conviction motion or appeal then?
To continue with our intra-state illustration, “A trial court addressing
a motion for a mistrial ‘must decide, in light of the entire facts and
circumstances, whether the defendant can receive a fair trial’ despite
the claimed error.141 The court must grant the motion if it determines
that the claimed error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a
mistrial.”142
Whether read by a lawyer, a linguist, or merely a literate adult,
these tests are, at least functionally, indistinguishable. One hinges on
whether the trial was “infected . . . with unfairness,”143 the other two
on whether it was a “fair trial.”144 One focuses on the “seriousness of
the error,”145 and another on whether the “errors were so serious.”146
As far as the error’s impact, one is concerned with whether the error
was “harmless in the context of [the] case,”147 another asks whether
the error was “sufficiently prejudicial” in light of the “entire facts and
circumstances,”148 and another requires a showing that the error
“prejudiced the defense.”149
These supposedly different standards are nothing more than non-
sensical distinctions that merely pay lip service to fairness and due
process. Given this, the appellate lawyer must ask whether, in the
given jurisdiction, there is a true advantage to the client in cramming
acts of prosecutorial and judicial misconduct through Strickland’s ill-
suited, two-step IAC framework.150 If there is not, then the appellate
lawyer may instead choose to go after the prosecutor or judge directly
via the plain error doctrine or some other state-specific doctrine.151
140. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
141. State v. Knapp, 2010 WI App 71, ¶ 4, 325 Wis. 2d 402, 786 N.W.2d 489 (inter-
nal citation omitted).
142. Id.
143. State v. Cameron, 2016 WI App 54, ¶ 18, 370 Wis. 2d 66, 885 N.W.2d 611.
144. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Knapp, 2010 WI App 71, at ¶ 4.
145. Cameron, 2016 WI App 54, at ¶ 11.
146. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
147. Cameron, 2016 WI App 54, at ¶ 11.
148. Knapp, 2010 WI App 71, at ¶ 4.
149. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
150. See Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1835 (discussing the different goals of the plain
error and IAC tests).
151. Once again, the analysis is highly state-law specific and may vary based on the
precise type of error alleged and even state-law burden-shifting mechanisms. For ex-
ample, plain error claims may have the disadvantage of being limited to only certain
types of error, but once an error qualifies for the analysis, the burden may shift to the
state to prove the error was harmless. See, e.g., State v. Jorgenson, 2008 WI App 60, ¶
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If appellate lawyers would consistently use plain error—and, in the
process, explain to appellate courts why Strickland should not be used
to blame defense lawyers for the actions of unethical government
agents—the appellate courts might, eventually, do something about
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. As one court warned in the
context of repeated prosecutorial misconduct, “If [the improper argu-
ment] continues, the appellate courts will be compelled, as appellant’s
counsel argues, to fashion a special remedy and reverse convictions so
obtained to provide an effective means of deterring further
misconduct.”152
On the other hand, if appellate lawyers continue to blame defense
lawyers, through Strickland, for the government’s misconduct, the un-
ethical prosecutors and judges will likely escape responsibility, and ap-
pellate courts will likely continue to deny defendants’ IAC claims.
B. Simplifying Strickland
While the above Section presents a complicated, state- and fact-spe-
cific strategic choice for appellate lawyers,153 true legal reform by the
courts would be incredibly easy to implement. In states where the
plain error test is more difficult to satisfy than Strickland’s second
(prejudice) prong, state appellate courts can simply continue with
Strickland, but eliminate its first prong whenever the defendant’s IAC
claim is rooted in acts of prosecutorial or judicial misconduct as op-
posed to true defense-counsel errors. This puts all of the focus on the
second prong—the harm caused by the prosecutor or judge—thereby
incorporating the directness of the plain error standard while main-
taining Strickland’s easier-to-satisfy test for demonstrating prejudice.
23, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77. The analysis may also be fact specific. For exam-
ple, the appellate lawyer might want to first ask defense counsel, before filing the
post-conviction motion or appeal, why he or she failed to respond to prosecutorial or
judicial misconduct at trial. If counsel reveals that he or she remembers the miscon-
duct but made a split-second decision not to object to avoid drawing further attention
to the prosecutor’s remarks, or to avoid inflaming the already agitated trial judge,
such information might factor into the appellate lawyer’s decision of whether to pur-
sue IAC or plain error. That is, such information, if revealed at a post-conviction
evidentiary hearing, could doom an IAC claim before it even gets to Strickland’s sec-
ond prong, thus making a plain error claim the better option. In addition to IAC and
plain error, some states may also offer appellate lawyers a third option for certain
types of error: an “interest of justice” claim. See, e.g., State v. Bvocik, 2010 WI App
49, ¶ 1, 324 Wis. 2d 352, 781 N.W.2d 719. This may bring an additional advantage in
that the defendant may not have to demonstrate prejudice at all. See, e.g., State v.
Hicks, 549 N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1996). Yet another consideration in choice of claim may
be the preservation of post-conviction avenues in federal court once a defendant’s
state court remedies are exhausted. That topic, however, like many of the other juris-
diction- and fact-specific nuances discussed in this footnote, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
152. Briggs v. State, 455 So. 2d 519, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
153. See supra note 151 & Section VI.A.
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State courts are free to modify Strickland’s two-part test, or any
other U.S. Supreme Court rule or test, as long as they provide defend-
ants with greater protection than is afforded by the U.S. Constitu-
tion.154 And the reformed Strickland standard proposed in this
Section would, in fact, provide greater protection. By eliminating the
first prong—determining whether defense counsel had a strategic rea-
son for not objecting to the government’s misconduct—it reduces the
number of hurdles the defendant must leap to obtain a new trial. That
is, once a court determines that prosecutorial or judicial misconduct
occurred, the court simply determines whether it prejudiced the
defendant.155
Neither is there anything unique about this proposed legal reform.
Courts have already eliminated or modified one of the two Strickland
prongs under certain circumstances.156 Courts should extend this prac-
tice and eliminate the first prong whenever a judge’s or prosecutor’s
misconduct, as opposed to a genuine defense-counsel error, is at the
root of a defendant’s IAC claim.
This proposed legal reform is theoretically sound; it recognizes and
is based on the ethical and constitutional obligations of prosecutors
and judges. For example, if a defense lawyer fails to effectively cross-
examine the state’s witnesses, he or she violates the ethical duties of
competence and diligence which, in turn, implicates the constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel157 and the right of confron-
tation.158 Likewise, prosecutors and judges also have ethical duties
and constitutional obligations to the defendant.159 Given these inde-
pendent obligations, instead of reviewing prosecutorial and judicial
misconduct indirectly through the defense lawyer and the IAC frame-
154. See Klein, supra note 19, at 1471 (discussing Hawaii’s rejection of Strickland).
155. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The court must first find
that the prosecutor or judge committed misconduct. But the court must do so regard-
less of whether it analyzes the case under Strickland or plain error. In this sense,
Strickland could be thought of as a three-part test: (1) Did a prosecutor or judge
commit misconduct?; (2) Did defense counsel perform deficiently in failing to object
and/or seek a remedy?; and (3) Was the defendant prejudiced by defense counsel’s
deficient performance? Similarly, the plain error test would become a two-part test:
(1) Did a prosecutor or judge commit misconduct?; and (2) Was the defendant
prejudiced by the prosecutor’s or judge’s misconduct? This is a generalization, of
course, as the plain error standard is state-specific and may incorporate a formal test
for the type of error that qualifies for the analysis.
156. See Kirchmeier, supra note 15, at 440–55 (discussing numerous circumstances
in which the defendant is not required to satisfy the prejudice prong of the two-part
test). Similarly, under the first prong regarding deficient performance, courts have
already adjusted their analysis for things outside of defense counsel’s control that af-
fect his or her decision-making. See Klein, supra note 19, at 1459 (“limitations of time
and money may affect strategic decisions, and . . . these choices are owed
deference.”).
157. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
158. For more discussion on the constitutional right of confrontation, see generally
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
159. See supra Part III.
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work, appellate courts should simply review the government’s miscon-
duct directly. This is best illustrated by returning to the fact patterns
of two cases discussed earlier.
If, for example, a prosecutor vouches for the state’s witnesses dur-
ing closing argument, the prosecutor violates not only a basic rule of
trial procedure160 but also the ethical duty as a “minister of justice,”
which includes “specific obligations to see that the defendant is ac-
corded procedural justice.”161 This, in turn, implicates the defendant’s
constitutional right to due process, among other rights.162
Similarly, when a judge fails to understand the statute governing
witness competency and prevents a defense witness from testifying,163
the judge violates a basic rule of trial procedure and the judge’s ethi-
cal duty of competence in the law (if the judge was genuinely igno-
rant)164 or the ethical duty of impartiality (if the judge’s “mistake”
was actually disguised judicial bias).165 In turn, this implicates the de-
fendant’s constitutional right to present a defense,166 and, in the case
of judicial bias, the due process right to an unbiased tribunal.167
Given that judges and prosecutors have their own ethics rules and
constitutional obligations, appellate courts have a basis for analyzing
judicial and prosecutorial misconduct independently of the defense
lawyer. Judges’ and prosecutors’ misdeeds should not be
“shoehorned” into the Strickland IAC framework or analyzed through
defense counsel’s ethics rules and constitutional obligations, all of
which are separate and distinct.168
Prosecutors and judges are likely to oppose the above legal reform,
pointing to the contemporaneous objection rule. As one appellate
court put it, the defendant (through his or her appellate lawyer) “can-
not sing a song to us that was not first sung in trial court” by defense
160. See Jordan v. Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 847 (7th Cir. 2016) (discussing “improper
vouching”).
161. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
162. Jordan, 831 F.3d at 847 (“The Court expresses its concerns about vouching in
constitutional terms: ‘Due process requires that the accused receive a trial by an im-
partial jury free from outside influences.’”) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 553 (1976)).
163. See Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 2012).
164. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.5(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“A
judge shall perform judicial and administrative duties, competently and diligently.”).
165. Id. r. 2.2 (2007) (requiring that “[the] judge shall uphold and apply the law,
and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”).
166. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 331 (2006).
167. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 878 (Md. 1999) (“[F]undamental to a
defendant’s right to a fair trial is an impartial and disinterested judge.”); State v.
Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, ¶ 10, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114 (“A biased tribu-
nal . . . constitutes a ‘structural error.’”).
168. See Woodruff, supra note 36, at 1834–35 (discussing how acts of prosecutorial
and judicial misconduct are forced into the IAC framework and blamed on defense
counsel).
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(trial) counsel.169 However, the policy behind the general rule that de-
fense counsel must first object at trial to preserve errors for review is
not implicated when a prosecutor or judge causes the problem.
In other words, the defendant’s conviction “will not ordinarily be
set aside for error not brought to the attention of the trial court”
(through objection by defense counsel).170 “This practice is founded
upon considerations of fairness to the court and to the parties” as it
allows the court to terminate the offending conduct and provide a
remedy on the spot.171 But when the court (the judge) or the opposing
party (the prosecutor) commits the misconduct, all considerations of
fairness “to the court and to the parties” go out the window.172 To
apply the court’s song analogy cited earlier, the prosecutor or judge
cannot cause a problem at trial and then later complain of unfairness
because defense counsel did not react to the government’s misconduct
at trial.173
Holding judges and prosecutors responsible for their own behavior
is a very modest proposal. In fact, there is a strong argument to be
made that much more is required of our so-called ministers of justice
(prosecutors) and our neutral and detached magistrates (judges). This
is particularly true regarding judges. “A trial judge ‘does not serve his
purpose or function by being merely an umpire, a referee, a symbol,
or an ornament.’”174 Additionally, judges have an obligation to ac-
tively protect defendants’ rights before and during trial.175
However, defense lawyers in the trenches of trial practice know that
such lofty proclamations are, at best, illusory. Quite to the contrary,
many judges openly and proudly serve as the second prosecutor in the
courtroom.176 Given this harsh reality, this Article advocates for a le-
gal standard whereby judges are merely required to perform as unbi-
169. State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 1999).
170. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159 (1936) (emphasis added).
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Id.
173. See Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d at 325.
174. Peter A. Joy, A Judge’s Duty to Do Justice: Ensuring the Accused’s Right to the
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 140 (2017) (quoting Alfred
Gitelson & Bruce L. Gitelson, A Trial Judge’s Credo Must Include His Affirmative
Duty to Be an Instrumentality of Justice, 7 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 7, 8 (1966)); see also
Patrick S. Metze, Speaking Truth to Power: The Obligation of the Courts to Enforce
the Right to Counsel at Trial, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 163, 195 (2012) (“[T]he Supreme
Court in Cuyler v. Sullivan confirmed a long established duty upon the trial court—a
duty to the Constitution and a duty to the defendant—to protect the defendant and
his right to a fair trial by enforcing this fundamental right of freedom: the right to
effective, adequate assistance at all critical stages of the prosecution . . . .”); William
W. Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Counsel—The Trial Judge’s Role, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 633 (1980).
175. See Joy, supra note 174, at 155–56.
176. See Sevilla, supra note 3 (discussing multiple examples of pro-state advocacy
from the bench); Smith, supra note 3, at 267–71 (discussing examples of “biased bul-
lies” on the bench); Johnson v. State, 722 A.2d 873, 877 (1999) (judge actively playing
role of prosecutor from the bench).
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ased umpires or referees—the bare minimum the Constitution
requires—and defense lawyers are not responsible for educating them
and are not held accountable for judicial failures.
Analyzing prosecutorial and judicial misconduct directly, instead of
criticizing defense counsel for not properly monitoring the prosecutor
or educating the trial judge, removes the defense lawyer from the
equation. Such a direct approach goes straight to the source: the un-
ethical prosecutor or judge. Further, as discussed below, implementing
this efficient, direct-to-the-point legal reform would produce tremen-
dous benefits; it would solve the numerous problems created by the
staggering overuse and gross misapplication of Strickland.
VII. THE BENEFITS OF REFORM
The above-described legal reform is not only simple and easy to
implement, but would also produce numerous benefits merely by cut-
ting an unnecessary, counterproductive, and harmful step out of
Strickland’s two-part IAC framework. This would be accomplished ei-
ther by appellate lawyers using the plain error test (whenever the
state’s plain error test is the equivalent of, or easier to satisfy than,
Strickland’s second prong) or by appellate courts maintaining the
Strickland framework but eliminating its first prong (whenever the
state’s plain error test is more difficult to satisfy than Strickland’s sec-
ond prong). There are at least six identifiable benefits to this proposed
reform.
First, nothing in this new framework would change defense coun-
sel’s options for dealing with prosecutorial and judicial misconduct at
trial. Counsel may still object if he or she chooses to do so. Objecting
is sometimes wise, as it may terminate the government’s misconduct
before it causes too much harm, and it also allows defense counsel to
request a remedy such as a curative instruction.177
Second, while defense counsel may still object if he or she chooses
to do so, this new, simplified framework relieves the defense lawyer
from the obligation to do so. It saves the defense lawyer from having
to perform three jobs in one. No longer would defense counsel be held
177. This approach makes more intuitive sense in the case of prosecutorial miscon-
duct than judicial misconduct. See generally Cicchini, supra note 62, at 913–22 (dis-
cussing objecting to a prosecutor’s misconduct during closing arguments). Conversely,
it may not be reasonable to expect that lodging an objection over judicial misconduct,
to the very same judge that is committing the misconduct, will bear much fruit. In fact,
it could further aggravate the situation. See Oade v. State, 960 P.2d 336, 338 (Nev.
1998) (discussing counsel’s reluctance to challenge the trial judge “for fear of antago-
nizing him and thereby prejudicing a client’s case”). However, under Strickland’s ex-
isting two-part test, it may be a necessary step in most circumstances. See Section
III.A. Therefore, given the current state of the law in many jurisdictions, a legitimate
approach for defense counsel at trial is to object to, and request remedies for, all acts
of judicial misconduct (as well as prosecutorial misconduct), or the failure to do so
could lead to an IAC claim.
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accountable, after the fact, for failing to properly monitor the prosecu-
tor’s compliance with ethics and trial rules, or for failing to correct and
educate the judge in the middle of trial.178
Third, under this new, simplified framework, the defendant actually
has a chance of winning a new trial based on acts of prosecutorial and
judicial misconduct. No longer could the appellate court preserve a
marred conviction by invoking defense counsel’s reasonable trial
strategy when declining to object, or by invoking a (possibly) more-
difficult-to-satisfy prejudice standard under the plain error doctrine.179
Fourth, eliminating Strickland’s first prong—which requires an in-
quiry, often years later, into defense counsel’s thought process at
trial—will save defense counsel a great deal of wasted time.180 It will
also save a tremendous amount of court resources that are now being
used in an absurd attempt to reconstruct the defense lawyer’s thinking
several years after the fact. These currently wasted resources include
the judge’s time, the time and cost of courtroom personnel such as
court reporters, and the cost of transporting incarcerated defendants
for post-conviction hearings.
Fifth, this new approach would protect defense lawyers from the
numerous consequences of IAC claims, including the risk of profes-
sional discipline, when such claims are based on the acts of govern-
ment agents over which defense counsel has no control.181 Eliminating
Strickland’s first prong—whether directly by the courts or indirectly
through appellate counsel’s use of the plain error test in lieu of Strick-
land—rightly places the blame where it belongs: on the judge or pros-
ecutor that violated his or her ethics rules and the defendant’s
constitutional rights.
Sixth and finally, placing blame where it belongs and analyzing
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct directly, instead of through the
existing IAC lens, will create highly desirable incentives and deter-
rents.182 Once prosecutors realize that their ethics violations will no
longer be covered up by Strickland’s first prong, but are more likely to
result in the reversal of a conviction and the referral of their miscon-
duct to the ethics board, prosecutors will stop breaking the rules.
Once judges realize that their incompetence, bias, and other forms of
misconduct are more likely to result in a second trial, judges will begin
to take an interest in, and responsibility for, their own ethical and pro-
fessional obligations.
In sum, when the players in the appellate court system stop misus-
ing Strickland’s IAC framework to blame defense counsel and sweep
prosecutorial and judicial misconduct under the rug, these govern-
178. See supra Section III.C.
179. See supra Section V.A.
180. See supra Section V.B.
181. See supra Section V.B.
182. See supra Section V.C.
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ment agents will begin to comply with their own ethical and profes-
sional obligations and will demonstrate more respect for the
defendant’s constitutional rights.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Strickland’s two-part test was designed to ensure defendants their
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. For example,
when defense counsel fails to adequately prepare for trial, effectively
cross-examine the state’s witnesses, subpoena defense witnesses, or
make a cogent and logically consistent closing argument, he or she
breaches the ethical duties of competence and diligence which, in
turn, constitutes deficient performance.183
Such allegations of deficient performance may serve as the founda-
tion for a convicted defendant’s Sixth Amendment IAC claim. When
such a claim is made, the post-conviction or appellate court engages in
a two-part analysis: Did defense counsel, in fact, perform deficiently,
and, if so, did the deficiency prejudice the defendant? If the answer to
both questions is yes, then the court may grant the defendant’s IAC
post-conviction motion or appeal, and the defendant may get a new
trial.184
This two-part framework is useful, but it is intended only for defense
counsel’s breach of ethical or professional duties. In fact, Strickland’s
underlying theory is clear: the two-part test should be difficult for the
defendant to satisfy so that judges and prosecutors do not have to
retry cases because of defense counsel’s errors, as such errors fall en-
tirely outside the control of judges and prosecutors.185
Unfortunately and bizarrely, however, courts have dramatically ex-
panded Strickland to make defense counsel responsible not only for
his or her own errors, but also for judicial and prosecutorial miscon-
duct—things that are directly within the control of those government
agents and are therefore ill-suited to Strickland’s two-part test.186 This
unjustified blame-shifting to defense counsel benefits unethical judges
and prosecutors by relieving them of their professional obligations,
and it causes identifiable and serious harm to defendants, defense law-
yers, and the general integrity of the criminal justice system.187
This Article proposes an incredibly simple legal reform. Instead of
filtering acts of judicial and prosecutorial misconduct through Strick-
land’s ill-suited, two-part IAC framework, the post-conviction and ap-
peals processes should go straight to the source of the problem and
analyze judicial and prosecutorial misconduct directly.188 This new,
183. See supra Part II.
184. See supra Part II.
185. See supra Part IV.
186. See supra Part III.
187. See supra Part V.
188. See supra Part VI.
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simplified approach is theoretically sound. Defense counsel need not
and should not be held to answer, through Strickland’s existing IAC
framework, for prosecutorial and judicial misconduct. These govern-
ment agents also have ethical obligations to the defendant, the viola-
tion of which also implicates the defendant’s constitutional rights.189
Their actions should therefore be evaluated independent of defense
counsel.
This streamlined, direct approach yields several benefits: it relieves
the defense lawyer from having to monitor the prosecutor and edu-
cate the judge at trial; it gives the defendant a reasonable chance of
obtaining relief for prosecutorial and judicial misconduct; it simplifies
the post-conviction analysis and saves a tremendous amount of public
resources; it protects defense counsel from ethics complaints for ethi-
cal violations committed by the prosecutor or judge; and, by placing
blame where blame belongs, it provides incentives for prosecutors and
judges to follow their own ethical obligations which will restore integ-
rity to the criminal process.190
189. See supra Part III & Section IV.B.
190. See supra Part VI.
